Recent votes in the former Soviet states of Georgia and Moldova have been dogged by interference from Russian-backed elements. Both countries had previously aspired towards closer ties with western Europe and future membership of the EU. And in both countries there is a strong suggestion of influence from Moscow that could jeopardise those aspirations.

The Moldovan government held a referendum on the country’s EU accession target for 2030 on October 20. Despite consistent polling suggesting that 60% of Moldovans support further integration, the referendum only passed by a slim majority of 50.4%.

On the same day, the first round of Moldova’s presidential election saw pro-European incumbent Maia Sandu secure 41% of the vote. This was insufficient for an outright win. Sandu now faces a run off against her closest rival, pro-Russian Alexandr Stoianoglo, who garnered 26% of the first vote.

In the run-off, Stoianoglo will be backed by the two other candidates, both them pro-Russian populists. This makes a Sandu reelection far from inevitable.

Meanwhile, in Georgia’s parliamentary elections on October 26, Georgian Dream won its fourth consecutive term with 54% of the vote, its best result to date. It will allow the pro-Russia party to retain control of the government and continue the process of pulling the country further away from Europe and towards closer ties with Moscow.

This is despite the fact that there has been consistently strong popular support for EU integration and growing dissatisfaction toward Georgian Dream’s increasingly pro-Russian policies.

The difference between public opinion as expressed by independent polling in both Moldova and Georgia and the outcomes of these votes has raised suspicions of interference. These suspicions have been further corroborated by international and domestic election monitoring organisations raising concerns that the elections were not entirely free and fair.

The pro-European camps in both Moldova and Georgia say Russia is behind this. There is a suggestion that these efforts are part of Russia’s multifaceted hybrid warfare. It’s a campaign aimed at destabilising these countries and hindering their European integration.

Russia has long manipulated domestic fears and grievances. The Kremlin and its agents have strong influence over media, civil society organisations and the orthodox church.

Both Moldova and Georgia also have a Russian military presence. In Moldova this is in the breakaway region of Transnistria, where there is a “peacekeeping force” of about 2,000 troops. Georgia has two pro-Russia breakaways making up 20% of the total land area of the country, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The war in Ukraine has also heightened concerns in both both countries about Moscow’s ambitions towards them. Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party campaigned for a closer relationship with Russia.

Its slogan, “No to war! Choose peace!” contrasted peace and alignment with Russia with being dragged into a war by the west. In Moldova opposition parties used similar rhetoric, calling for Russian protection and framing EU integration as a threat to national sovereignty. This resonated particularly among Russian-speaking populations.

Russia’s influencers have also escalated cultural tensions in both countries. In Moldova, Moscow-backed opposition groups have rallied conservative segments of society to fight against governments efforts to introduce EU-aligned anti-discrimination legislation.

Similarly, the Georgian Dream party introduced Russian-style anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in Georgia to appeal to the traditional family values of conservative and religious voters. By leveraging such issues, Russia has aimed to exploit people’s cultural concerns, to increase political polarisation, and to affect political choices.

Follow the money

But the most important way the Kremlin, or people associated with Russia, is interfering in the domestic politics of Georgia and Moldova is money. In the case of Moldova, fugitive pro-Moscow tycoon Ilan Shor (who lives in Moscow after being found guilty of fraud in Moldova) has been accused of bribery and helping orchestrate electoral fraud. Shor has denied any wrongdoing connected to the election.

Georgian banking and tech billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili one of the country’s wealthiest oligarchs, founded Georgian Dream in 2012. He has been described in one article as “the man who bought a country”. With a fortune worth the equivalent of 25% of Georgia’s GDP, he is thought to wield an outsize influence in the country’s politics, influence he reportedly uses to “tilt the country towards Moscow” (although some say he primarily furthers his own interests).

Ivanishvili himself, announcing his return to mainstream politics in 2023 as the honorary chair of Georgian Dream, said the party’s role was to “protect our national identity, restore state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and transform Georgian into a high-income state till 2030 and bring it into the European Union”.

In the conditions in these countries, individuals’ vast resources can be used unchecked for political activities. The influx of funds disadvantages opposing parties, who don’t have access to similar financial backing. They have created a lopsided political environment that favours Russian-aligned candidates.

There is also a risk that informal or unchecked financing could also have funded election day irregularities. Reports of vote buying, ballot stuffing and violence at polling stations were observed in both countries.

In one incident in Moldova captured by the BBC, a woman from Transnistria, where people still hold Moldovan citizenship, was filmed openly inquiring where she should go to receive payment for her vote.

In Georgia, Ivanishvili’s influence allegedly extends to civil servants and the electoral commission as well as the judiciary, which rules on complaints of vote rigging. Claiming victory shortly after polls closed, Ivanishvili said: “It is a rare case in the world that the same party achieves such success in such a difficult situation.”

The exact impact of Russian interference remains difficult to prove. But the dramatic apparent shifts in electoral sentiment are highly suggestive. This kind of election interference opens the door for autocratic leaders to gradually dismantle democratic institutions.

This then allows them to enact further illiberal policies, such as the hated recent “foreign agents” law modelled after similar Russian legislation, which targets pro-democracy civil society organisations critical of the government.

Moldovans are now preparing to vote in the run-off election on November 3, which will determine the immediate future of the country and could affect its future relationship with Europe. Many Georgians, meanwhile – led by the country’s president, Salome Zourabichvili – have taken to the streets to protest what Zourabichvili has called the “total falsification” of the vote.

If she and Sandu are right, Russia – along with its supporters – appears to be trying to achieve, through this “hybrid warfare” in Georgia and Moldova, what it is striving for on the battlefield in Ukraine: regaining control over currently free nations that used to be Russia’s obedient satellites.